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Abstract 
 
Dual Processing theory proposes that the ability to over ride associative 
(System 1) in favour of analytical (System 2) processed in deductive reasoning may 
depend on inhibitory control. The present study applies this association to a spatial 
reasoning task by adapting a mental rotation task to a multichoice format including 
System 1 (mirror) and System 2 (rotated image) responses. Fifty undergraduate 
volunteers from the University of Canterbury responded to a Stroop task as a measure 
of inhibitory control that was compared with System 1 and System 2 responding from 
a spatial and a deductive reasoning task. It was expected that people with weaker 
inhibitory potential would make more System 1 and fewer System 2 responses in both 
deductive and visual-spatial reasoning tasks. Contrary to expectation System 2 
responding dominated for both tasks and correlations between both reasoning tasks 
and measures of inhibitory control were non-significant. The differing idiosyncratic 
demands of each task may have obscured any common variables associated with 
inhibitory control. This research initiated a test for the presence of System 1 and 
System 2 in spatial reasoning. 
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1.0 Introduction 
 
1.1 System 1 and System 2 (Evans 2001, 2003) 
Contemporary reasoning research distinguishes two systems of reasoning 
(Evans 2002). System 1 reasoning is an implicit process of reasoning which is rapid, 
automatic, and independent of general intelligence (Evans, 2003). System 1 reasoning 
is also known as associative reasoning because it relies on quick associations to 
identify objects and events with prior knowledge. System 1 reasoning provides people 
with heuristics to solve everyday problems. When a learned response has been 
practised until it is automatic, it becomes part of System 1 reasoning.  System 1 
thinking is said to be unconscious, so people become conscious only of the final 
product of System 1 thinking processes. System 1 reasoning is said to occur when 
people identify a situation and generate a rapid, well practised solution, such as when 
people step on the brake pedal at a red traffic light. In contrast, System 2 reasoning is 
said to be slow, explicit, and controllable, it is correlated with general intelligence and 
often requires more effort. System 2 reasoning is thought to be required for analytical 
mathematical types of reasoning, and is often referred to as analytical reasoning. 
System 2 should be useful in novel situations where people have to generate more 
difficult solutions in response to an event. People tend to have more conscious 
awareness of System 2 thinking processes. System 2 processing might be required 
when making plans or solving logic problems. Although reasoning research 
distinguishes System 1 and System 2 modes of thinking, very little research has 
applied these models to spatial reasoning. The present thesis proposes extending the 
distinction to spatial reasoning by using a variant of the mental rotation paradigm. 
This thesis also explores the role of individual differences in inhibitory control in the 
propensity to favour System 1 over System 2 models in deductive and spatial 
reasoning. 
 
1.2 Belief Bias (Evans, 2001) 
Previous studies on deductive reasoning have demonstrated that associative 
reasoning processes (System 1) can dominate analytical processing (System 2) 
(Evans, 2001; Stanovich and West, 2002). Deductive reasoning tasks usually involve 
assessing the validity of a conclusion from two or more given premises, by deducing 
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the logical validity of the given form of the argument, while ignoring content and 
inferences based on prior belief or knowledge. Reasoning problems can be classified 
according to the relation between logical validity and prior belief or knowledge. 
Logic-belief consistent problems are those where conclusions derived from logic 
calculus are consistent with prior knowledge or belief. Logic-belief conflict problems 
are those where conclusions derived from logic calculus contradict prior belief or 
knowledge. Neutral problems are devoid of semantic content and are those where the 
premises and conclusions do not involve prior belief or knowledge. People tend to 
produce choices that agree with prescriptions from logic calculus on deductive 
reasoning tasks when the truth-value of the content (either true or false) is consistent 
with the logical form of the argument (Evans, 2003). When the truth-value in the 
content is at odds with the logical conclusion belief bias may occur. Belief bias is the 
tendency to solve logic-belief inconsistent problems using the truth-value of the 
content rather than logical validity.  
 
Dual process theory is used to account for the belief bias effect in deductive 
reasoning tasks. When the logic response that relies on System 2 and the prior belief 
response that relies on System 1 are put into conflict, people tend to respond 
according to prior belief (Stanovich, 1999; Evans 2003). Dual processing theory 
argues that System 1 responding is so powerful that even when intelligent adults, such 
as university students are specifically instructed to respond according to the logical 
validity of the argument, they still show a tendency to respond according to prior 
belief. Dual process theory argues that System 1 responding is so powerful that it is 
difficult to suppress, in favour of a System 2 response, and therefore in deductive 
reasoning tasks, people display a tendency to respond according to prior belief, rather 
than on the logical validity of the argument.  
 
1.3 Inhibition (Nigg, 2001) 
The ability to suppress a System 1 response in favour of a System 2 response 
is considered to be related to individual differences in inhibition (Handley et al, 
2004). In this context inhibition is taken to be the deliberate suppression of a 
prepotent cognition or response in order to achieve an internally represented goal 
(Nigg, 2001). This class of inhibition is referred to as “executive inhibition”, although 
Nigg distinguishes several types (Friedman and Miyake, 2004). As children develop, 
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inhibition ability tends to improve and the active suppression mechanism becomes 
more efficient. Children become more efficient at keeping task irrelevant information 
from entering the stream of processing and are better able to deactivate information 
which is peripheral to central task performance (Harnishfeger and Bjorklund, 1994). 
Variations in inhibition are thought to directly affect behavioural impulsivity, self-
control and selective attention as well as reasoning performance. Friedmann and 
Miyake (2004) and others have used the Stroop task to assess prepotent response 
inhibition because it measures the ability to override the habitual more automated 
response of reading in favour of colour naming. In the present study the Stroop task is 
used to determine whether people who have weaker inhibitory control will provide 
more System 1 responses in both visual-spatial and deductive reasoning tasks 
compared to those who have stronger response inhibition scores.  
 
To demonstrate whether there is a correlation between inhibition and the 
tendency for System 1 to dominate System 2 processing in both types of reasoning, 
this study will compare measures of inhibitory control using the Stroop task with the 
frequency of System 1 errors in both deductive and visual spatial reasoning tasks. 
There are clearly demonstrated neural subsystems implicated in the suppression of the 
preponent colour name in the Stroop task. In particular the anterior cingulate gyrus, 
which is known to be involved in suppression and executive control, is activated 
during incongruent ink colour- colour word Stroop trials (Nigg, 2001). The Stroop 
task can be considered to measure the ability to inhibit irrelevant stimuli when the 
speed of naming the colour of rows of “x’s”, with the speed of naming the ink colour 
of incongruent colour words is compared. By comparing the Stroop inhibition scores 
to measures of System 1 responding in deductive and visual-spatial reasoning it will 
be possible to determine whether those exhibiting greater inhibitory control display a 
tendency to suppress System 1 responses in favour of System 2 responses.  
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1.4 Mental Rotation (Shepard and Metzler, 1971) 
Although reasoning research distinguishes System 1 and System 2 processing, 
there has been very little application of these models to spatial reasoning. This thesis 
aims to further advance the reasoning distinction in dual processing theory by using a 
variant of the mental rotation paradigm. An adaptation of Shepard and Metzler’s 
(1971) mental rotation work will be used to provide possibilities for both System 1 
and System 2 responses. This is achieved in a multi-choice version of the Shepard and 
Metzler mental rotation task in which participants select a shape that is identical to a 
designated standard shape (see Appendix B). The System 2 response requires rotation 
of one of the comparison set into alignment with the standard in order to determine 
their identity. The System 1 alternative is a mirror image representation of the 
standard and requires no rotation to bring it into alignment with the standard. By 
adapting the mental rotation task to induce competing System 1 and System 2 
processing, it may be possible to determine whether System 1 processing has a 
tendency to dominate System 2 in the visual-spatial domain as well as deductive 
reasoning situations. 
 
It will also be interesting to compare responses from the deductive and mental 
rotation tasks with a measure of inhibitory performance, to determine whether the 
relationship between inhibitory control and the ability to suppress System 1 responses 
is similar for spatial reasoning and deductive reasoning tasks. A correlation between 
measures of inhibitory control and the tendency to make System 1 errors has been 
reported in several studies involving various deductive reasoning tasks (Handley, et 
al., 2004) and could reflect differences in the ability to decontextualise a problem 
from prior knowledge or difficulties in performing in an unfamiliar environment 
(Stanovich and West, 2002).  
 
The present study investigates how individual differences in inhibitory control 
might affect visual-spatial and deductive reasoning. Given the previous findings, it is 
expected that measures of inhibitory control, deductive reasoning and visual spatial 
reasoning should be positively correlated. This study could demonstrate that there is a 
tendency to provide System 1 responses in both visual-spatial and deductive 
reasoning tasks, and that this tendency is mediated by individual differences in 
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inhibitory control, which may be involved in the suppression of System 1 responding 
in favour to System 2 processes for both types of reasoning.  
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2.0 Behavioural Studies 
 
2.1 Deductive Reasoning and Inhibitory Control  
(Handley et al., 2004) 
 It could be suggested that individual differences in executive inhibitory control 
reflect variations in general cognitive ability. Under this assumption a correlation 
between deductive reasoning scores and Stroop interference would demonstrate that 
more able people solve harder problems better. That possibility is excluded by 
findings from Handley et al. (2004) which demonstrate that inhibitory control can be 
distinguished from general cognitive ability, working memory, or intelligence. 
Handley et al. (2004) provided 61, ten year old children with conditional and 
relational, deductive reasoning items in which the believability of the conclusion and 
its logical validity were systematically manipulated. The items were either logically 
valid or invalid and either neutral, believable or unbelievable. Participant responses 
which favoured the belief status of the conclusion required a tendency to disregard the 
logical validity of the task and demonstrated a tendency toward System 1 responding. 
Responses which favoured logical validity and ignored the belief status of the 
conclusion demonstrated analytical reasoning and System 2 involvement.  
 
Participant responses to the deductive reasoning items were compared with 
measures of inhibitory control. Inhibitory control was measured using a stop signal 
task. Participants responded with a key press when an “x” or an “o” was presented on 
a computer screen, but had to inhibit a response on random trials whenever a tone 
preceded an “x” or an “o”. Inhibitory control was measured by the number of 
correctly “stopped” responses during the stop signal trials. Handley et al. found that 
participants who responded according to the belief status in the deductive reasoning 
task received lower scores on the stop signal task, and those who tended to respond 
according to the logical validity received higher scores on the inhibition task. Handley 
et al. argued that participants with lower inhibition scores also received lower scores 
on the deductive reasoning task because they had difficulty suppressing the System 1 
response in favour of the System 2 response. The Handley et al. study demonstrated 
support for the relationship between inhibitory control (measured as the ability to 
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suppress a prepotent response) and the ability to suppress a System 1 response to 
allow for the processing of a System 2 response in a deductive reasoning task.  
 Prior knowledge intrudes over analytic processes in belief bias deduction 
problems. There is no comparable prior knowledge regarding 3-D blocks of the 
Shepard type that leads participants to favour mirror image over rotated versions. This 
is spatial/perceptual reasoning, so the capture of System 1 comes from what the 
mirror image looks like compared to the standard. System 1 tends to rely on 
associations, stereotypes, similarity and visual recognition, as well as prior belief 
(Sloman, 1996). The mirror image is used in the mental rotation task as a System 1 
response because the tendency to accept a “sloppy” match has to be resisted in favour 
of an analytic rotation. This System 1 response could be a distracting irrelevant 
intrusion, which may require inhibition to suppress.   
 
2.2 Dual-Code Theory (Santa, 1977) 
Imagery based on knowledge from stored representations in working memory 
is involved in both mental rotation and deductive reasoning. This process may be 
involved in mental rotation when forming a comparison between a standard and 
rotated object, and during deductive reasoning to compare relations between the 
premises and conclusion. Dual-code theory (Pavio, 1971) claims that separate 
representations are required for verbal and spatial information (Anderson, 2005). This 
suggests the importance of comparing the effects of inhibition on System 1 and 
System 2 reasoning for both verbal and spatial information. Santa’s (1977) findings 
demonstrate support for Dual code theory. Santa compared a geometric experimental 
condition during which participants studied an array of three geometric objects, with a 
verbal experimental condition, where participants studied words arranged exactly as 
the objects in the geometric condition were arranged (Fig 2.1). All the test stimuli in 
the geometric condition involved geometric objects and in the verbal condition all test 
stimuli involved words, but otherwise the test stimuli in both conditions presented the 
same possibilities. The participants’ task was to verify that the test array contained the 
same elements as the study array, although not necessarily in the same spatial 
configuration. The first test array was identical to the study array (same configuration 
condition). In the second array, the elements were displayed in a line (linear 
configuration condition). Santa (1977) found that in the geometric condition 
participants’ were accurate and faster in their judgements when the geometric test 
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array preserved the configuration condition information in the study array. But when 
participants had encoded words from the study array linearly, they were faster when 
the test array was linear. According to Anderson (2005), some visual information such 
as geometric objects tend to be stored according to spatial position, while other 
information such as words tend to be stored according to linear order (or normal 
reading order right to left). If Dual-code theory claims that there are separate 
processes for storing images based on words and spatial configurations, then it would 
be worth comparing the effects of inhibitory control on System 1 and System 2 
reasoning for both types of imagery storage processes.    
 
Figure 2.1 
Santa’s 1977 Linear and Configuration Visual Information Storage Experiment  
{ SHAPE  \* MERGEFORMAT } 
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2.3 Visual-Spatial Reasoning (Tversky, 2005) 
When reasoning tasks are presented in either a picture or verbal format there are 
qualitative differences in the cognitive processing involved. For example, Tversky 
(1969) found in a same-different memory study, that when participants expected the 
target stimulus to be a picture they encoded the first stimulus pictorially. When 
participants expected the target stimulus to be a name they encoded it verbally, 
irrespective of how the first stimulus was presented. The cognitive processing 
involved in mental rotation has been linked to perceptual processing, while the 
processing involved in reading and listening involves constructing representations 
which are more schematic and less detailed (Tversky, 2005). Tversky’s research 
found qualitatively different cognitive processing involved in pictorially and verbally 
presented stimuli. It will therefore, be interesting to compare the different presentation 
formats of visual-spatial and deductive reasoning to discover whether the tendency for 
System 1 to dominate System 2 holds for both types of cognitive processing.  
 
Tversky asserts that even though there are qualitative differences between 
pictorial and verbal representations, reasoning about these representations may 
involve similar visual-spatial processes. This suggests that the effect of inhibition on 
System 1 and System 2 processing could apply to reasoning based on both visual and 
verbal representations. According to Tversky (2005), reasoning means going beyond 
the information given or to transform the information in some way. Visual-spatial 
thinking is, therefore, involved in all types of reasoning. This is because whether a 
person is reasoning according to rules as in deciding whether a conclusion follows 
logically from its premises, or with visual spatial information (as in deciding whether 
a rotated shape is identical to a designated standard shape) they are required to 
transform or manipulate both types of information in a similar manner. Therefore, 
even though verbal and visual information are represented in different formats, 
reasoning about both types of information can involve visual-spatial thinking. This 
suggestion could then provide support for the idea that if System 1 and System 2 
processing occurs in reasoning based on verbal representations then similarly there 
may be System 1 and System 2 parallels where thinking involves visuo-spatial 
representations.  
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3.0 Neuroimaging Evidence 
 
3.1 A Relationship Between Reasoning and Inhibition (Goel and Dolan, 2003) 
Goel and Dolan (2003) used event related fMRI to study the functional 
neuroanatomy associated with belief bias during neutral, logic-belief consistent 
(facilitory) and logic-belief conflict (inhibitory) deductive reasoning conditions. Goel 
and Dolan’s findings provide neurological evidence for dual processing theory and 
they describe how the brain mechanisms interact when System 1 is inhibited to allow 
System 2 processing during deductive reasoning. Goel and Dolan (2003) gave 
participants several reasoning tasks where the belief value and logical validity of the 
conclusion were systematically manipulated so that with logic-belief conflict trials 
answers based on prior belief would be inconsistent with the logical validity, while in 
logic-belief consistent trials the belief value and logical validity were consistent. 
Participants were asked to press a button to indicate whether they thought the 
conclusion was logically valid or not.  
 
An fMRI analysis comparing blood oxygenation level dependent activation 
(BOLD) revealed a left temporal lobe system involvement when reasoning was based 
on prior belief, and involvement of a bilateral parietal system when logically based 
reasoning occurred. An event related fMRI scanning during correct belief-neutral 
trials showed activation of the bilateral superior parietal lobes. The parietal system is 
known to be involved in the internal representation and manipulation of spatial 
information and abstract mathematical reasoning involving numerical quantities. This 
suggests that the neural structures involved in spatial processing are the basic building 
blocks for belief-neutral logical reasoning (Goel and Dolan, 2003). An analysis of 
BOLD activation during incorrect logic-belief conflict trials, when participants 
answered according to prior belief instead of logic, revealed that the left ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) was activated. The neural structures of the ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex have been implicated in guessing, intuitive responding, and in non-
logical belief based responding (Goel and Dolan, 2003). Further analysis revealed 
relative deactivation of the left VMPFC during logic-belief consistent trials and 
correct logic-belief conflict trials. The patterns of activation observed by Goel and 
Dolan provide evidence favouring a distinction between semantic belief laden 
 {PAGE  } 
components of reasoning and logico-deductive components that appear to some 
degree at least to be fundamentally spatial in origin.   
 
Goel and Dolan (2003) also illustrated the brain processing involved in the 
inhibition of a System 1 response in favour of System 2 responses during deductive 
reasoning tasks. For a correct response during logic-belief conflict trials participants 
were required to recognise the conflict between the believability and logical validity 
of the conclusion, inhibit a response consistent with their belief, and engage a 
reasoning mechanism. For an incorrect response participants were unable to detect the 
conflict between belief and logic, or unable to inhibit the response based on prior 
belief. Goel and Dolan point out that the right prefrontal cortex has been previously 
implicated in inhibitory control. because it has been found to be activated when 
participants successfully inhibited a response associated with belief bias and provided 
the correct logical response. These findings, therefore, implicate the role of inhibitory 
control in the suppression of a System 1 in favour of System 2 responding. 
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4.0 Theoretical Support for the Current Study 
 
4.1 Mental Models Theory (Johnson-Laird, 2005) 
While dual processing theory focuses on providing explanations for belief bias 
in deductive reasoning tasks, mental models theory also provides an account of 
visual-spatial reasoning as well as providing an alternative explanation for belief bias 
in deductive reasoning. According to Johnson-Laird (2005) perception provides 
people with models of the world that lie outside of themselves, while an 
understanding of discourse provides people with models of the world that a speaker 
describes to them. Thinking which enables people to anticipate the world, and to 
choose a course of action, relies on internal manipulations of these mental models. 
Mental model theory suggests that in deductive reasoning, people form mental models 
of the propositions and competing mental models that represent the alternative logical 
form of the argument. Therefore, even though reasoning problems may be presented 
either spatially (as in mental rotation) or verbally (as in deductive reasoning), mental 
model theory supposes that the same reasoning processes are elicited by both types of 
reasoning problems (Goel, Buchel, Frith, and Dolan,  2000).  
 
While dual processing theory can explain the way in which System 1 and 
System 2 processes interact to affect belief bias in deductive reasoning, the mental 
model account can provide an explanation for both visual spatial and deductive 
reasoning. From the studies discussed so far representing the dual processing 
approach, it is concluded that there is neurological evidence for two distinct brain 
mechanisms corresponding to System 1 and System 2 in deductive reasoning. 
Furthermore, these findings suggest that inhibitory processes may affect the ability to 
override System 1 processing in favour of System 2. With the addition of evidence 
from the studies representing the mental models approach, it is also possible to 
conclude that reasoning about verbal and visual stimuli may involve overlapping 
neurological systems. By combining evidence from both System 1 versus System 2 
and Mental Model approaches it is possible to infer that System 1 and System 2 
processes could apply to reasoning about both visual and verbal stimuli.  
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Therefore based on findings from the previous studies, the present study aims 
to extend the finding that System 1 responding, which produces errors in deductive 
reasoning, also results in errors in visual-spatial reasoning and to show that people 
who have weaker inhibition control would provide more System 1 responses in both 
visual-spatial and deductive reasoning tasks compared with those who have stronger 
response inhibition scores.  
 {PAGE  } 
5.0 Measuring Inhibition and Reasoning 
 
The study by Handley et al. (2004) provided evidence of System 1 and System 2 
reasoning by providing an accurate measure of deductive reasoning from a set of 
relational and conditional reasoning problems. In the present study deductive 
reasoning was measured from a set of questions involving relational and conditional 
reasoning problems derived from Handley et al. 2004. The conclusions were either 
consistent, neutral, or inconsistent with respect to prior belief, and either logically 
valid, logically invalid, or indeterminate and required a yes/no response (see appendix 
A). For deductive reasoning a measure of System 2 processing was derived from 
responses that were consistent with the logical validity of each conclusion while a 
measure of System 1 processing was derived from responses that were consistent with 
the believability of each conclusion regardless logical validity. The mental rotation 
test was adapted from Shepard and Metzler, 1971. Each trial comprised a standard 
block and four comparison blocks. The four comparison blocks included the rotated 
standard block (System 2), a mirror reflection of the standard block (System 1) and 
two distractor blocks that were neither mirror images nor rotations of the standard.  
 
5.1 Hypothesis 
Three hypotheses were tested in the present study. Firstly in deductive reasoning 
people will tend to opt for the dominant heuristic (System 1) response rather than rely 
on the slower more effortful processing required to make an analytical (System 2) 
response and it is expected that System 1 responses will be made more quickly. 
Second, people will also make System 1 responses in visual spatial reasoning tasks 
where it is expected that incorrect mirror image choices will be made more often and 
more quickly than correct rotated versions of the standard.  Finally people with 
weaker inhibitory potential will make more System 1 (associative errors) and fewer 
System 2 (analytical) responses in both deductive and visual-spatial reasoning tasks.
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6.0 Method 
 
6.1 Participants  
Fifty undergraduate volunteers from the University of Canterbury, were recruited 
via email. There were 22 Males and 28 Females. Participants received $7 student 
cafeteria vouchers for participation in the study.  
 
6.2 Deductive Reasoning Task 
The deductive reasoning task consisted of 12 relational and 12 conditional 
reasoning problems adapted from Handley et al. (2004) for use with local university 
students. Each problem consisted of three sentences, including two premises and a 
conclusion, which appeared simultaneously on the screen and remained present until a 
“Yes” or “No” response was made indicating the validity of the conclusion. The 
conclusions to reasoning problems were varied to be either, believable, unbelievable 
or neutral and either logically valid, invalid or indeterminate. (Table 6.1, and 
Appendix A). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 {PAGE  } 
Table 6.1 
The Number of Reasoning Problems in Each Category Based on Belief and 
Logical Validity Used in the Deductive Reasoning Task 
 
Belief Validity Example No. of 
problems 
in each 
category 
Believable Valid Whales are bigger than dolphins.             
Dolphins are bigger than goldfish.                      
So, are whales bigger than goldfish? 
2 
Believable Invalid Dunedin is North of Christchurch.  
Christchurch is North of Wellington. 
So, is Wellington North of Dunedin?  
5 
Unbelievable Valid Cricket balls are bigger than golf balls.                
Golf balls are bigger than rugby balls.                  
So, are cricket balls bigger than rugby 
balls?       
5
Unbelievable Invalid Goldfish are smaller than dolphins.  
Dolphins are smaller than whales. 
So, are whales smaller than goldfish?  
2 
Neutral Valid Nids are bigger than Yigs.  
Yigs are bigger than gons.  
So, are Nids bigger than gons? 
1 
Neutral Invalid Dambles are stronger than Heagles. 
Heagles are stronger than Ringoes. 
So, are Ringoes stronger than Dambles? 
1 
Neutral Indeterminate Bappeds are happier than Zingles.  
Wabs are happier than Zingles.  
So, are Bappeds happier than Wabs?    
3 
Believable Indeterminate Sunflowers are grown in fields.  
Things that contain chemicals  
are grown in fields. 
So, do sunflowers contain chemicals? 
2 
Unbelievable Indeterminate Bees fly in the sky.                                           
Insects that live on mars fly in the sky. 
Do bees live on mars?                                       
2 
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Statements were arranged so that incongruent (prior belief was inconsistent 
with the logical validity of the conclusion) and congruent (prior belief was consistent 
with the logical validity of the conclusion) statements each included an equal number 
of correct “yes” and “no” responses (based on the logical validity of the conclusion). 
Problems that were logically indeterminate were treated as distracters and not 
included in the analysis of the results. Participants were instructed to decide for each 
problem whether the conclusion was correct, assuming that the first two statements 
were true. The following instruction screen was read before commencing trials:  
 
“Reasoning Problems: In this task you are going to receive twenty 
 five problems, each with two statements and one conclusion. It is 
 important to pretend that the first two statements in each problem  
are true (even if they sound a bit funny or strange). For each problem,  
your task is to decide whether the conclusion (in italics) would be  
correct or not, assuming that the first two statements are true.  
Does the conclusion follow from the two statements (yes/no)”. 
 
After the instructions the deductive reasoning background was presented 
(Figure 6.1) (168 mm high and 226mm wide) and remained in view throughout the 
deductive reasoning task. The background consisted of three rectangles including a 
large central rectangle (96mm high and 116mm wide) and two text boxes (each 12mm 
high and 23mm wide) set 34mm apart. Each deductive reasoning problem was 
presented in the large rectangle, the word “Yes” was written in the centre of the box 
on the left and the word “No” in the box on the right. Participants indicated their 
response by using the mouse to locate the cursor and click in the “Yes” or “No” box. 
Reasoning stimuli were presented on a 17 inch Viewsonic computer screen using 
Superlab Pro 2.0 to control presentation, and to record response times and response 
choices. 
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Figure 6.1 
Example of the On Screen Display Used for the Deductive Reasoning Task 
YES No
Whales are bigger than dolphins. 
Dolphins are bigger than goldfish. 
So, are whales bigger than goldfish?
                       
 
6.3 Mental Rotation Task 
The mental rotation task comprised one practice and 17 test displays.  Each 
display contained five boxes (27mm high and 25mm wide) (Figure 6.2) each 
containing a 2-D depiction of a 3-D block object. A standard object appeared in the 
left most box. The remaining four boxes contained a picture plane rotation of the 
standard object (30 to 330 degrees in 30 degree increments), an aligned mirror image 
version of the standard object and two foil objects that were neither mirror image or 
rotated versions of the standard. The positions of the comparison blocks in each 
display were randomly determined. Block objects were formed from 7 to 15 three 
dimensional blocks (3mm high, 3mm long and 2mm wide). The standard and 
comparison objects in any display contained the same number of component blocks. 
Participants were instructed to use the mouse to position the cursor and “Click on the 
shape on the right that is physically identical to the shape on the left.” This instruction 
remained in view at the top of every display screen and an arrow with accompanying 
text identified the correct rotated image on the instruction display. Displays remained 
in view until a response was made whereupon the next display appeared without 
delay. Superlab Pro 2.0 was used to control the trial sequence and record response 
choices and response times.  
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Click on the shape on the right that is physically 
identical to the shape on the left.
Figure 6.2 
 Example of the On Screen Display Used for the Mental Rotation Task 
                 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.4 Stroop Task  
The difference in ink colour identification times for incongruent colour names 
and control stimuli in a Stroop task provided the measure of inhibitory control (Nigg, 
2001). According to Nigg, reading is a faster and more automatic process than colour 
naming and people with poorer inhibition have greater difficulty inhibiting the 
irrelevant reading response in preference to colour naming. The Stroop task can 
therefore, be considered as a measure of the effectiveness of an interference 
suppression mechanism involved in inhibition. 
 
The display (see Figure 6.3) comprised a central black rectangle measuring 
28mm high by 45mm wide upon which the incongruent colour names and control 
strings of X’s appeared. This was surrounded by four rectangular coloured patches 
each measuring 32mm high and 47mm wide. Participants indicated the font colour of 
the text when it appeared in the central black rectangle by moving the cursor from the 
centre of the central black rectangle to the appropriate coloured area and clicking the 
left mouse button. On each trial centred in the central black rectangle were either a 
row of X’s (printed in blue, green, red, or yellow) or a colour word written in one of 
three incongruent colours. Time between the onset of a word or letter string in the 
central rectangle and click of the mouse in one of the four coloured rectangles was 
measured together with identification of the area clicked. The stimuli were presented 
using locally produced software, which was used to control screen presentation, 
record participant selection and response times. This software was used because it 
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was capable of recording response times to millisecond accuracy which is not 
guaranteed in Superlab with cursor positioning input.  
 
Figure 6.3 
Example of the On Screen Display Used for the Stroop Task. 
                               
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Participants completed 432 Stroop trials. The four colours generated a set of 
4 x 3 = 12 incongruent colour word stimuli. Rows of X’s equal in length to the colour 
names (3, 4, 5 and 6 letters) were constructed and each printed in the four colours to 
give a set of 4 x 4 = 16 neutral stimuli. To give a total of 72 trials for each block, there 
were 36 incongruent and 36 neutral stimuli. Each block comprised 3 sets of the 12 
incongruent colour word stimuli (3 x 12 = 36), 2 sets of the 16 neutral stimuli (2 x 16 
= 32), and an extra set of 4 rows of X’s each a different length and printed in a 
different ink colour. These stimuli were randomised within each of six blocks to yield 
a total of 432 trials which were presented in a continuous sequence. 
 
The first screen instructed participants that they would be required to click the 
mouse icon on a colour patch that matched the ink colour of the letters in the centre, 
and to do so as fast and as accurately as possible. The instruction screen included a 
small example (similar to the one in Figure 6.3) Participants were told that there were 
432 presentation screens and that the task would take about ten minutes. Participants 
were asked if they understood the procedure and then told to press the space bar to 
begin the first trial. This was followed by the appearance of the background screen 
and first letter presentation. The background screen comprising the central black 
rectangle and the four surrounding coloured rectangles remained in view during all 
blue 
blue
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Stroop trials. Only the text appearing in the central black region changed, and it did so 
immediately the mouse was clicked in one of the four coloured rectangles.  
 
6.5 Procedure  
Participants were tested individually in a quiet room. They first read an 
information sheet and signed a consent form. They then completed the Stroop task 
and either the deduction or spatial reasoning task, the order of these tasks being 
randomly determined The complete experiment took between 20-30 mins depending 
on the speed of the participant. At the end of the experiment each participant was 
thanked, given a $7.00 café voucher and a brief explanation of the research.
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7.0 Results 
 
7.1 Deductive Reasoning Results 
A dominance of System 1 over System 2 responding was hypothesised. 
System 1 responding can be detected on conflict problems where belief is pitted 
against validity. The proportion of the 10 conflict (believable invalid + unbelievable 
valid) problems that receive a belief consistent response provides a measure of 
System 1 dominance. Participants who always chose the logically valid response 
would score zero by this measure. A participant who chose at random observing 
neither validity or belief would on average score 50%. Over the 50 participants the 
proportion of conflict trials given belief consistent responses ranged from 0% to 90%; 
the median was 10%. A total of 47 of the 50 participants scored less than 50%. This is 
the number of participants for whom System 1 is not dominant over System 2. Clearly 
belief bias is not present and the hypothesised dominance of System 1 over System 2 
has not occurred. Further evidence that participants have typically chosen in accord 
with logical validity comes from neutral trials. Logically correct responses were 
chosen to 90% of neutral problems, which was well above chance at 50%. Because 
the high proportion of logically valid responses to conflict trials it was not possible to 
explore response time differences between System 1 and System 2 responses to 
conflict trials.  
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7.2 Mental Rotation Results 
 
Figure 7.1 
Mean Percent for Each Type of Response to Mental Rotation Tasks 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Rotate Mirror Foil/2
Type of response
M
ea
n
 
pe
rc
en
t o
f r
es
po
n
se
s
 
 It was hypothesised that System 1 responses (selection of the aligned mirror 
image alternative) would dominate in the visual spatial reasoning task. Contrary to the 
hypothesis significantly more correct rotated image alternatives (mean = 67.2%, SD = 
22.83) than mirror image alternatives were selected (mean = 21.1%, SD = 20.46), 
t(49) = 7.75, p<0.001 2-tail).  
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Figure 7.2 
Mean Response Times (ms) for Each Type of Response During the Mental 
Rotation Task 
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It was expected that incorrect mirror image choices would be made more 
quickly than correct rotated versions of the standard. A total of eight participant 
response times to rotated and mirror images were not included in this analysis, as 
seven participants made no mirror image responses and one response time contained 
an outlier affecting the group mean. Contrary to expectation response times to rotated 
images (Mean = 14.8 s., SD = 58.7 s) were significantly faster than response times to 
mirror images (Mean =18.1 s , SD =12.2 s, t(41) = -2.25, p<0.05 2-tail).
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7.3 Stroop Results 
 
Figure 7.3 
Percent of Colour Errors and Mean Response Times (ms) to Control and 
Incongruent Stroop Tasks. 
Analysis of the Stroop data revealed that there were more errors and slower 
RTs to incongruent colour words than to control letter strings. Font colours were 
incorrectly identified on fewer than 1% of trials, such errors occurred approximately 
twice as often to incongruous colour names (mean = 1.2%, SD = 1.5%) than to 
control strings of X’s (mean = 0.5%, SD = 0.7%), t(47) = 3.07, p<0.01 2-tail). 
Response times to control stimuli were faster (mean = 815 ms, SD = 120 ms) than 
response times to incongruent stimuli (mean = 832 ms, SD = 122 ms). This difference 
was close to significance, t(49) = 1.97, p = 0.055 2-tail).  
 
7.4 Correlation of System 1 Responding with Stroop Inhibition Scores. 
It was expected that people with weaker inhibitory potential would make more 
System 1 (associative errors) and fewer System 2 (analytical) responses in deductive 
reasoning. Stroop interference scores were obtained by calculating the difference 
between median incongruent and control RTs for each participant and the raw 
difference and difference as a proportion of average RT were calculated.  Since the 
two measures produced very similar results only analyses involving the raw 
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differences hereafter called inhibitory control scores are reported.  High inhibitory 
control scores measured larger differences between Incongruent minus Control 
response times suggesting weaker inhibition. It was, therefore, expected that bigger 
System 1 conflict deduction scores would be associated with larger Stroop difference 
scores. The correlation between inhibitory control scores (Inhibitory control = 
incongruent-control) (Appendix C) and number of System 1 responses to conflict 
trials was not significant (r=-0.19, p=0.29).  
 
 It was also expected that weaker inhibitory control would be related to more 
System 1 (mirror image) and fewer System 2 (rotated) responses in visual spatial 
reasoning. A measure of System 1 strength (Number of mirror images/(mirror image 
plus rotation)) was compared with inhibitory control. The System 1 strength ranged 
between 0 (all rotations) to 1 (all mirror images). No significant association was found 
between inhibitory control scores in the Stroop task and percent of System 1 scores 
the mental rotation task (Diff and System 1 r=0.21, p= 0.24).  
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8.0 Discussion 
 
8.1 Summary of Results 
Three hypotheses were tested in the present study. Firstly, for deductive 
reasoning a dominance of System 1 over System 2 responding was hypothesised. The 
analysis, however, revealed a higher proportion of System 2 than System 1 responses 
to deductive reasoning trials. The second hypothesis was that more people would 
make System 1 responses than System 2 in visual spatial reasoning tasks, yet the 
mental rotation analysis revealed significantly more rotated image than mirror image 
responses. It was also expected that System 1 responses would be made more quickly 
than System 2, but contrary to expectation, response times to rotated images were 
significantly faster than response times to mirror images. Thirdly, it was hypothesised 
that people with weaker inhibitory potential would make more System 1 and fewer 
System 2 responses in both deductive and visual-spatial tasks, but no association was 
found between inhibitory control and System 1 responding in either task. Although 
these results were not significant there was a tendency for a greater frequency of 
System 1 errors to occur among those with less inhibitory control, and for more 
correct System 2 choices to be made by those with stronger inhibitory control.   
 
 It is possible the hypothesis that System 1 would dominate System 2 reasoning 
for deductive reasoning was not supported because the tasks were too easy for 
University students. This is consistent with Stanovich and West (2000) who found 
that general cognitive ability is associated with the ability to resolve belief bias. 
Additionally, Evans (2002) claims that conclusion believability is clearly irrelevant to 
the logical task and should have no influence if people were reasoning logically. In 
similar previous studies, confusion over syntax and the nature of the quantifiers used 
in the premises have led to lower rates of logic based responding (Evans, 2002). Poor 
instructions have also been responsible for lower rates of logic based responses. The 
high proportion of System 2 responding in the current study could indicate that the 
task was relatively free of attributes which while unrelated to logical form may 
nevertheless complicate the task resulting in higher rates of System 1 responding. 
That is the absence of poor instructions or confusion over syntax may have assisted 
System 2 responding. Nevertheless variability between participants in levels of 
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System 1 responding did occur sufficiently often to allow analysis and comparison 
with measures of inhibitory control. Despite this, there was no significant correlation 
with inhibitory control. 
 
For the mental rotation task, there was also a higher proportion of System 2 
responses and it is possible that attributes to a System 1 bias and unrelated to the 
logical task were also effectively controlled. For instance, the instructions were clear, 
there was little confusion in the presentation, and there was a clear separation between 
the tasks required to make System 1 and System 2 responses. System 1 responses 
were more likely than filler responses suggesting that the selection of a mirror image 
response represented a possible System 1 bias, as opposed to a general error response. 
Although there was sufficient variability in the rates of rotation choices among 
participants, the correlation with Inhibitory Control was not significant and there was  
no strong support for the hypothesis.    
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8.2 Methodological Limitations 
The findings from the present results are not statistically reliable. For both the 
Deductive reasoning and Mental rotation task there were very few System 1 
responses. This important lack of availability of System 1 responses to compare with 
variations in inhibitory control, may have affected the significance of correlations 
between these variables. Further studies may need to provide reasoning tasks with a 
higher cognitive demand, so as to increase the potential for System 1 responding. By 
imposing some memory load on the reasoning task, System 1 responding could 
potentially increase. Also by developing more difficult or complex tasks, imposing a 
dual task requirement, or by adding a peripheral visual, or auditory distracter System 
1 responding could potentially increase. The deductive reasoning task had very few 
System 2 control tasks to compare System 2 with System 1 reasoning in the conflict 
trials, so further tasks would improve with the addition of more belief neutral control 
items. With only 50 participants, the statistical power of the study was relatively low 
and any measurement effect struggled to reach significance. The Stroop effect was not 
precise because of limited participant numbers and possibly the inherent variability in 
the cursor task.  A well practiced key press or a voice response may have provided a 
more sensitive and precise measure of Stroop interference. 
 
Inhibitory control was not significantly correlated with System 1 or System 2 
processing in the spatial task. It seems likely that the mental rotation task was not as 
effective at measuring and capturing the relationship between inhibitory control and 
reasoning response. This is possibly due to the nature of the visual display in the 
mental rotation task. Further studies might include alterations to the design of a spatial 
task, which might more effectively capture a potential relationship between inhibitory 
control and System 2 responding. A new visual-spatial task that requires participants 
to compare pictorial displays similar to those elicited in mental imagery during the 
deductive reasoning task, could provide a more effective comparison with the 
deductive reasoning measures. Also a timer in the corner of the display might induce 
faster responding and a higher System 1 response rate. A dual task, requiring a higher 
memory load might also facilitate increased System 1 response rates in the mental 
rotation task.  
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8.3 Implications for Inhibitory Control in Reasoning 
According to Friedman and Miyake (2004), studies that rely on difference 
scores have a tendency to reduce reliability between measures, as different versions of 
the task that differ in inhibitory requirements may increase measurement error 
(Friedman and Miyake, 2004). It is therefore, possible that the inhibitory control 
required for System 2 processing is different to the type of inhibitory control required 
for the Stroop task. Non significant correlations might also occur because individual 
tasks may not be tapping into inhibition related functions (Friedman and Miyake, 
2004). According to this contention, it is possible that the present findings suggest 
that System 2 may not require inhibitory control to over ride System 1. This view, 
however, seems unlikely and contradicts Handley et al.’s (2004), findings that 
inhibitory control processes are related to the ability to over ride prior belief in favour 
of logic in deductive reasoning.  
 
Friedman and Miyake (2004) also suggest that non significant correlations 
between inhibition related functions are typical and offer several additional 
explanations which have various implications for the presence of inhibitory control in 
the comparison tasks. Practice effects might cause a reduction in reliability, which 
could lead to non significant results. While novel tasks impose high attentional 
control demands, once the tasks have become well practised idiosyncratic strategies 
may develop to cope with the task demand, reducing reliability of the measures 
(Friedman and Miyake, 2004).   
 
Shilling, Chetwynd, and Rabbitt (2002) also found zero order correlations 
when they investigated construct validity across four measures of inhibition in a 
sample of 49 older adults. They compared four variants of the Stroop task that used 
colour words, figure-ground stimuli, numbers, and arrows. The correlations between 
the Stroop interference effects on the four tasks ranged from -.13 to .22 and were all 
non significant. They concluded that these tasks had no convergent validity and that 
any common inhibition ability was probably obscured by the idiosyncratic demands 
of each task. A large proportion of the variance in each task may reflect individual 
variations in other idiosyncratic requirements with only a small proportion of the 
variance actually capturing variation in inhibitory control processes (Friedman and 
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Miyake, 2004). Similarly it seems likely that in the current study the distinctive 
features pertaining to each task obscured any possible measure of shared inhibitory 
control.  
 
8.4 Implications for Dual Processing Theory 
The present study did not achieve a belief bias effect and was unable to find an 
association between inhibitory control and System 1 or System 2 reasoning. Previous 
studies (Evans, 2001; Goel and Dolan, 2004; Handley et al., 2004) have typically used 
these measures as behavioural evidence to support Dual processing theory.  Thus, 
according to these measures, the present study was unable to find behavioural 
evidence to support dual processing theory.  
 
Dual processing theory (Goel et al., 2000) proposes, however, that subjects 
may reason by either engaging a System 1 associative mechanism or consciously 
engage in a System 2 mechanism. It is therefore possible, that the lack of behavioural 
evidence to support dual processing theory was due to the high rate of System 2 
reasoning. The design of the tasks elicited either System 1 or System 2 responding 
and it could be argued that because the System 2 processing was consciously engaged 
that this remained activated throughout the trials for most participants, resulting in a 
low System 1 response rate. The low System 1 responding may have then reduced the 
correlation with inhibitory control. Dual processing may well have occurred, but the 
relationship between inhibitory control and the ability to override System 1 reasoning 
in favour of System 2 was not supported from the current findings.  
 
Dual Processing theory broadly defines a System 1 response as any rapid, 
automated, unconsciously processed implicit response and System 2 as any slow, 
effortful, consciously processed response. It is possible that the engagement of two 
processing Systems still occurred during task engagement and Dual Processing theory 
may be able to explain the high rate of System 2 responding in both tasks. Dual 
process theory proposes that reasoning about different types of spatial information 
may engage dissociable brain mechanisms. According to Goel, Makale, and Grafman 
(2004) meaningful familiar material engages a left hemisphere temporal lobe system 
and reasoning about meaningless unfamiliar material recruit a bilateral parietal 
system. Goel et al., (2004) argue that participants’ reasoning depends on situation 
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specific heuristic processes based on background knowledge and experience. When 
no heuristics are available as in reasoning about unfamiliar situations, formal methods 
recruit a frontal-parietal visuospatial system. It is possible that the complexity and 
unfamiliar visuo-spatial display in the present study engaged System 2 processing and 
that the mirror image display was not sufficiently familiar to engage System 1 
processing. While prior belief is considered sufficient to modulate System 2 reasoning 
(Goel and Dolan, 2003) the engagement of two distinct brain systems may primarily 
be a function of the presence or absence of meaningful content. The arbitrary content 
in the Mental rotation task may have recruited the System 2 reasoning processes and 
the absence of meaningful content may have been linked to the reduced System 1 
responding.   
 
8.5 Mental Models Theory 
Dual Processing and Mental models theories were developed to answer 
different questions, so they each have a different focus. While Dual processing places 
an emphasis on System 1 and System 2 and reasoning through language processing, 
the Mental Models approach focuses on the internal models that everyone has of the 
world and reasoning through visual-spatial processing. The mental models approach 
(Johnson-Laird, 2005) proposes that participants have internal representations of a 
logical argument which preserve the structural properties of the world that the 
sentences are about (Goel et al., 2000). This approach suggests that spatial reasoning 
serves as a basis for the abstract knowledge and inference required for deductive 
reasoning (Tversky, 2005). The mental rotation task required the transformation of 
internalised visual images of the standard to match the external target response. 
Mental models theory, therefore, fully explains the System 2 response for both tasks. 
The current findings, therefore, provide support for Mental model theory, but were 
less able to demonstrate support for Dual processing theory as typically evidenced by 
a belief bias effect or an association between lower inhibitory control and System 1 
processing.  
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8.6 Future Directions 
The current investigation into the relationship between inhibitory processing and 
System 1 and System 2 processing in Deductive and Spatial reasoning was an 
experimental process which required a new task design. The mental rotation task was 
designed to capture and measure System 1 and System 2 processing in spatial 
reasoning. Future investigations would need to further develop a task that could more 
effectively capture and measure the presence of System 1 and System 2 in spatial 
reasoning. A design that could elicit a higher System 1 response rate might possibly 
be achieved with an on screen timer to induce speeded responses, or with the addition 
of a dual memory task to increase cognitive load. Further developments to improve 
the effectiveness of the Stroop task may include higher participant numbers, more 
deductive tasks including more neutral control trials and a voice response or well 
practiced key press, or the addition of a peripheral visual, or auditory distracter 
Although there was some support for the current hypothesis from the results of the 
present study, with an improved experimental design, the relationship between 
inhibition and System 1 and System 2 in spatial reasoning could be better confirmed.  
 
A stronger association between inhibitory control and System 2 reasoning would 
need to be established before any conclusions can be drawn. Latent variable analysis, 
a statistical technique suggested by Friedman and Miyake (2004) could more 
effectively capture the common variance associated with inhibitory control, by 
creating a model of the underlying functions that contribute to each task and 
excluding variance attributable to idiosyncratic task requirements. If a stronger 
association was found between inhibitory control and System 1 and System 2 spatial 
reasoning, then the direction and causality of this relationship could be investigated. 
Further investigations would also need to establish whether an association between 
inhibitory control and System 1 and System 2 spatial reasoning is mediated by the 
presence of other variables, such as working memory, cognitive load or visual 
attention. If System 1 and System 2 are involved in Spatial reasoning, then everything 
that people see would be reasoned about according to whether they are using System 
1 or System 2.  
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9.0 Conclusion 
 
People tend to vary in inhibitory control processes and might reason either 
according to System 1 and System 2. This study verified that when instructions and 
logic requirements are clear and the participant sample is high in general cognitive 
ability, belief bias may not occur (Handley et al., 2004; Evans, 2003; Stanovich and 
West 2000). This study opens the way for future understanding of the processes 
involved in System 1 and System 2 reasoning and the possibility that inhibitory 
control could potentially be associated with System 1 and System 2 in spatial as well 
as deductive reasoning. By adapting the mental rotation task to become a multi-choice 
version including System 1 (mirror) and System 2 (rotated image) responses this 
initiated the development of a potential method for testing the presence of System 1 
and System 2 reasoning in a spatial format. Due to the differing idiosyncratic 
demands of each task which may have obscured any common variables associated 
with inhibitory control, the present study was unable to capture any possible 
relationship between individual variations in inhibitory control and System 1 and 
System 2 reasoning. 
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Appendix A 
Deductive Reasoning Problems 
 
1. Believable Valid 
 
Whales are bigger than dolphins. 
Dolphins are bigger than goldfish 
So, are whales bigger than goldfish? 
2. Believable Invalid 
 
Dunedin is North of Christchurch. 
Christchurch is North of  Wellington. 
So, is Wellington North of Dunedin? 
3. Believable Invalid   
   
Basketballs are bigger than tennis balls. 
Golf balls are bigger than Basketballs.                  
So, are tennis balls bigger than golf 
balls?            
4. Unbelievable Valid 
 
Wellington is North of Christchurch 
Dunedin is North of Wellington. 
So, is Dunedin North of Christchurch?  
5. Unbelievable Valid    
                                       
Cricket balls are bigger than golf balls.               
Golf balls are bigger than rugby balls.                  
So, are cricket balls bigger than rugby 
balls?       
6. Unbelievable Invalid 
 
Goldfish are smaller than dolphins. 
Dolphins are smaller than whales. 
So, are whales smaller than goldfish? 
 
7. Believable Invalid   
                                          
Timaru is bigger than Auckland.             
Christchurch is bigger than Timaru.    
So, is Auckland bigger than 
Christchurch?   
8. Unbelievable Valid 
 
Walking is faster than flying. 
Driving is faster than walking. 
So, is driving faster than flying? 
9. Neutral Valid   
                                                
Nids are bigger than Yigs.                  
Yigs are bigger than gons.              
So, are Nids bigger than gons? 
10. Neutral Invalid 
 
Dambles are stronger than Heagles. 
Heagles are stronger than Ringoes. 
So, are Ringoes stronger than Dambles? 
11. Neutral Indeterminate 
    
Bappeds are happier than Zingles.            
Wabs are happier than Zingles.             
So, are Bappeds happier than Wabs? 
12 Neutral Indeterminate 
 
Skibs are faster than Hedobs. 
Skibs are faster than Febozs. 
So, are Hedobs faster than Febozs? 
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13. Believable Valid  
   
Cars run on petrol.                                      
All things that run on petrol carry 
people.             
So, do cars carry people? 
14. Believable Invalid 
 
Cows have four stomachs. 
Animals with four stomachs are not 
heavy. 
So, are cows heavy? 
15. Believable Valid  
 
Horses have hooves.                                          
Animals that live near farms have 
hooves.           
So, do horses live near farms?                             
16. Believable Valid 
 
Teeth are made of calcium.        
Things that help us eat are made of 
calcium. 
So, do teeth help us eat? 
17. Unbelievable Valid  
      
Children read books.                                         
People who read books are 
neurosurgeons.        
So, are children neurosurgeons?                         
18. Unbelievable Invalid 
 
Carrots are vegetables. 
Vegetables do not grow on trees. 
So, do carrots grow on trees? 
19. Unbelievable Indeterminate 
     
Bees fly in the sky.                                           
Insects that live on mars fly in the sky.             
Do bees live on mars?                                       
20. Unbelievable Invalid 
 
Dogs bark. 
Animals that do not bark have two legs. 
So, do dogs have two legs?   
21. Unbelievable Valid  
     
Deer have antlers.              
Animals with antlers have four teeth. 
So, do deer have four teeth?   
22. Believable Invalid 
 
Rock stars drive to work. 
People who drive to work do not like 
loud music. 
So, do rock stars like loud music? 
23. Believable Indeterminate  
                         
Surgeons work a lot.                                          
Wealthy people work a lot.                                
So, are surgeons wealthy?     
24. Believable Indeterminate 
 
Sunflowers are grown in fields. 
Things that contain chemicals are grown 
in fields. 
So, do sunflowers contain chemicals? 
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Appendix B 
Presentation Stimuli Used in the Mental Rotation Task.  
 
Instruction: Rotated B,  Mirror D   
{ EMBED PowerPoint.Slide.8 } 
2 Rotated C,  Mirror A 
{ EMBED PowerPoint.Slide.8 } 
1    Rotated C, Mirror B 
{ EMBED PowerPoint.Slide.8 } 
4    Rotated A, Mirror B 
{ EMBED PowerPoint.Slide.8 } 
  3  Rotated D, Mirror C 
{ EMBED PowerPoint.Slide.8 } 
5    Rotated D, Mirror A 
{ EMBED PowerPoint.Slide.8 } 
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6    Rotated D, Mirror B 
{ EMBED PowerPoint.Slide.8 } 
7    Rotated B, Mirror C 
{ EMBED PowerPoint.Slide.8 } 
8    Rotated C, Mirror B 
{ EMBED PowerPoint.Slide.8 } 
9    Rotated C, Mirror A 
{ EMBED PowerPoint.Slide.8 } 
10    Rotated A, Mirror C 
{ EMBED PowerPoint.Slide.8 } 
11    Rotated D, Mirror A  
{ EMBED PowerPoint.Slide.8 } 
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  12  Rotated A, Mirror C 
{ EMBED PowerPoint.Slide.8 } 
   13  Rotated D, Mirror A 
{ EMBED PowerPoint.Slide.8 } 
   14 Rotated C, Mirror B 
{ EMBED PowerPoint.Slide.8 } 
15  Rotated B, Mirror C 
{ EMBED PowerPoint.Slide.8 } 
16    Rotated B, Mirror A 
{ EMBED PowerPoint.Slide.8 } 
17    Rotated A, Mirror C 
{ EMBED PowerPoint.Slide.8 } 
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Appendix C 
Correlation Matrix Comparing Reasoning and Stroop Responses 
 
Reasoning 
Variables 
RT 
Control 
RT 
Incong 
Diff = 
Incon-
Co 
Diff/ 
Control 
Err 
Control% 
Err 
Incong% 
Deductive       
Sys 1 .2283 .1433 -.1886 -.2188 .3694 -.0548 
 p=.201 p=.426 p=.293 p=.221 *p=.034 p=.762 
Corr Neut -.0917 -.0993 -.0744 -.0833 -.0130 -.2231 
 p=.612 p=.582 p=.681 p=.645 p=.943 p=.212 
Corr-Sys 1 .0699 .0067 -.1916 -.2196 .2338 -.2352 
 p=.699 p=.971 p=.286 p=.220 p=.190 p=.188 
Mental 
rotation       
% Rotate -.1250 -.1622 -.1976 -.2107 -.3301 -.2328 
 p=.488 p=.367 p=.270 p=.239 p=.061 p=.192 
% Mirror -.0124 .0550 .2357 .2661 .1685 .0532 
 p=.945 p=.761 p=.187 p=.134 p=.349 p=.769 
% Foil .2904 .2353 -.0493 -.0821 .3662 .3888 
 p=.101 p=.187 p=.785 p=.650 *p=.036 *p=.025 
S1strength .0285 .0833 .2115 .2367 .2368 .1265 
 p=.875 p=.645 p=.237 p=.185 p=.185 p=.483 
RT Rotate .1537 .1120 -.0713 -.0861 -.2859 -.0331 
 p=.393 p=.535 p=.694 p=.634 p=.107 p=.855 
RT mirror .1356 .1190 .0100 -.0011 -.1815 .0984 
 p=.452 p=.509 p=.956 p=.995 p=.312 p=.586 
RT foil .2183 .1440 -.1553 -.1811 -.2759 -.0156 
 p=.222 p=.424 p=.388 p=.313 p=.120 p=.931 
* Significant at p < 0.05 (N=50) 
